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REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Defendants avoid rather than answer the issues presented 
on appeal by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants create their own 
"Statement of Issues Presented for Review" which ha§ no 
correspondence with Plaintiffs1. (See Brief of Appellants page 1 
and Brief of Respondents page 1). The Defendants seek to divert 
the attention of this Court from the principal issues just as 
they succeeded with the lower court. The Defendants seek to 
focus the appeal on the questions of remedy and equity. Those 
issues are premature until the principal legal issues are 
determined. Issues of remedy and equity are difficult in this 
case but at this point they have not received even a preliminary 
hearing in the trial court. They are simply not ripe for 
appellate review. 
Despite Defendants' diversions, the central question of this 
appeal is whether there was a valid combination between CVD and 
IMPA. IMPA cannot focus on such a question for long since they 
have no authority upon which they can rely to justify their 
position. They can talk about the "few disgruntled", the 
"irreversible entanglements" and "ratification by subsequent 
mergers", but such cannot change the fact that the CVD merger was 
a sham and a clear attempt to circumvent the law. (See R. 66, 
80-81) . 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants' "Statement of Facts" focuses on the issue of 
rescission, implying that Plaintiffs seek rescission of some 
contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
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Plaintiffs1 claim, as stated in their First Cause of Action, is 
for money damages and only alternatively for separation of the 
two entities. The Plaintiffs' do not claim that the "Lettef of 
Intent" should be rescinded, which agreement was the standard of 
operation between IMPA and CVD until the purported merger. 
Plaintiffs do allege that the Letter of Intent is not part and 
parcel to the later purported merger, consolidation or transfer 
of assets. 
The real fact is that the Letter of Intent, although it laid 
the ground work for a future possible combination of the 
participating cooperatives, has little to do with Plaintiffs1 
lawsuit. The Defendants would like this Court to believe that 
the Letter of Intent was in fact the controlling document which 
legitimized Defendants' claim of "a transfer of assets". (R.66). 
Perhaps this is because Defendants know that Letter was the only 
thing that the record reveals was approved by the Board of 
Directors of CVD. In fact, a closer look at the Letter of Intent 
clearly reveals that any formal combination of the associated 
cooperatives would require "further board and/or membership 
approval of the parties as may be required by law at that time". 
(R. 537-538). Paragraph eight of the Letter of Intent clearly 
states that the assets of the various associated cooperatives 
would remain under the ownership of the respective parties and 
would be made available through lease or other mechanisms to 
IMPA. (R. 538). 
The Defendants allege in their "Statement of Facts" that it 
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would not be feasible to separate former CVD producers from IMPA, 
that farm pick .up routes have been adjusted to achieve economies 
which are irreversible, that insurance between the cooperatives 
has been combined, that capital purchases and leases have been 
entered into and that these "entanglements" and points of 
"detrimental reliance" justify the Court in foreclosing on the 
possibility that CVD and IMPA should or could be pulled apart. 
It seems odd that Defendants should emphasize the difficulty of 
remedies as their primary defense. A court sitting in equity 
will have to determine remedies after a full determination of 
facts. No one can prejudge what method a trial court will 
determine is best suited to correct the errors alleged by 
Plaintiffs. There are numerous alternatives with unlimited 
permutations from which the court sitting in equity can select. 
Plaintiffs did not ask for rescission but for money damages first 
and then alternatively for orders placing the parties back under 
the Letter of Intent. 
Interestingly, the Defendants' "Statement of Facts" failed 
to elucidate that all of the entanglements which Defendants refer 
to were as a direct and calculated result of the terms of the 
Letter of Intent which on its face was clearly terminable by its 
own provisions in paragraph 21 of the Letter of Intent. (R.541). 
The parties to the Letter of Intent anticipated the potentiality 
of ,a breaking apart from the entanglements of their association 
pursuant to the provisions of the Letter of Intent. 
In the second to the last paragraph on page 13 of 
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Defendants' "Statement of Facts", the Defendants state as a 
matter of fact that "the corporate entities of the four (4) 
cooperatives which formed IMPA possess no members, no assetg, no 
liabilities or any purpose for existing". Such a statement is 
clearly not fact but an erroneous legal conclusion. In fact, if 
the alleged combination between CVD and IMPA was improper and 
invalid it is void ab initio, similar to an annulment of a 
marriage, and CVD would be restored to its separate assets. If 
CVD had no Board of Directors, someone forgot to advise them 
since they held an official meeting after the alleged combination 
took place on December 17, 1987. (R. 547). 
The most disturbing part of the Defendants' "Statement of 
Facts" involves the recitation of voting results from a 
subsequent merger between IMPA and two other cooperatives. In 
the "Statement of Facts" the Defendants cite those voting results 
and imply that such was a referendum which ratified their earlier 
illegal acts. Any subsequent combinations of IMPA with other 
entities is irrelevant and immaterial. In fact, it is entirely 
possible and quite probable that certain members or equity 
holders voting on the subsequent IMPA merger did so only in the 
belief that they were preserving what equity interests they 
retained by now voting to move it to an entity that offered more 
stability than IMPA. It is interesting to note, however, that 
IMPA apparently learned how to conduct a proper combination of 
agricultural cooperatives as it did follow in this instance the 
procedures of Utah Code Section 3-1-30, (1953 as amended). Had 
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IMPA followed those same procedures which were also announced for 
the December 16, 1985 meeting, this entire dispute could have 
been avoided. 
The only relevant part of the Defendants1 entire "Statement 
of Facts" is that IMPA never followed the requirements of Section 
3-1-30 et seq. or any other statutory requirements in combining 
IMPA with CVD. Although the Defendants claim on page 9 of their 
"Statement of Facts" that the members of CVD "approved and 
authorized the transfer", a search of the referenced record from 
page 429 through 547 attributable to that alleged fact does not 
reveal any record to support the allegation. The only thing it 
does reveal is that there was in fact an advertisement served on 
some of the members of CVD of a meeting on December 16, 1985 to 
consider a merger/consolidation under Section 3-1-30 et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated. The meeting admittedly did not occur as 
advertised and the lower court so found. (R. 687-688). The only 
CVD Board action which came close to approving a merger was its 
authorization of the December 16th meeting. (R. 543). There is 
no evidence within the entire record that CVD ever approved a 
transfer of assets, let alone a plan of merger, but only a 
"meeting to merge". (Emphasis added). The unrefuted affidavits 
of Gordon Zilles, the author of the December 16, 1985 minutes, 
further clarify the purpose of the approved "meeting". 
Defendants claim in their "Statement of Facts" that 
Plaintiffs did not raise their challenge to the validity of the 
combination until two and a half (2 1/2) years from the date the 
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Letter of Intent was signed. Plaintiffs had no reason to 
challenge the validity of the Letter of Intent until the Letter 
ot Intent was transformed into an illegal combination and the 
claimed eradication of CVD as a autonomous cooperative. After 
the member meeting of December 16, 1985, the Deed to the Amalga 
CVD plant was transferred to IMPA without any notice to the CVD 
Board in August of 1986. The recitations in the Deed to a 
resolution of the CVD Board of directors is entirely imaginary. 
No meeting ever considered or approved any such deed. These 
activities were unknown in significant part to the Board until 
the Board Meeting held December 17, 1986. Suit was filed less 
than two (2) months later on February 13, 1987. Clearly the 
Plaintiffs acted timely and Defendants' arguments to the contrary 
simply attempt to divert the Court from the real issues. 
Finally, many of the references to the record reflected in 
Defendants' "Statement of Facts1' referred to depositions which 
were taken of the Plaintiffs without allowing time for 
Plaintiffs' attorney to cross-examine and without having the 
depositions completed. (R. 496). These partial depositions were 
never published and any reference to them on the record should be 
stricken and should not be considered by this Court. In 
addition, certain supplemental affidavits and memorandums were 
filed by the Defendants well beyond the deadlines for responses 
of motions before the Court pursuant to rule and without leave or 
approval from the lower court to file the supplemental documents. 
(R. 525-551). These documents should also be stricken from the 
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record and not considered by this Court. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. REPLY TO POINT I 
As stated before, the Defendants have intentionally 
mischaracterized the issue of rescission as it relates to this 
case, (R. 117-121). It is not the principal issue. The 
principal issue is what the Defendants did; the question of which 
remedy is to be involved is premature. In any event, the First 
Cause of Action sought money damages and only as an alternative 
to separate the two cooperatives. (See Verified Complaint (R. 6-
7). 
The Plaintiffs do not seek a "rescission" of the combination 
between CVD and IMPA, but since Defendants make it the primary 
object of their defense it merits some discussion. Rescission is 
a contractual remedy. One cannot have rescission unless there 
was first a. contract. Plaintiffs' action is not based on 
contract but based on statutory procedures for combining two (2) 
Utah agricultural cooperatives. Plaintiffs are not acting on any 
contract with Defendants in this case. The Letter of Intent is 
not at issue and there is no other contract between the parties. 
The only reference to rescission in Plaintiffs' complaint is in 
the Fifth and last Cause' of Action wherein Plaintiffs seek 
rescission of liens and other incumbrances on CVD assets which 
wese granted by IMPA to unidentified third-parties withoyt proper 
authority. 
Nevertheless, if the Court chooses to define Plaintiffs' 
8 
action as seeking rescission, that issue goes merely to the 
question of remedies available; the remedy must be fashioned only 
after all of the facts are heard by the trial court. Affidavits 
and depositions of the Plaintiffs clearly raised disputed issues 
of fact regarding whether the remedy of rescission would be 
available and to what degree. The lower court never acknowledged 
those disputed facts nor did it determine that such facts were 
undisputed. 
The lower court in its Memorandum Decision held that no 
rescission was available because there Mare many other entities, 
people involved, that have so changed their position and reliance 
from rhe transfer of assets that it would be inequitable for the 
Court to consider the remedies of rescission and restitution." 
The lower court cannot make such a finding without having a full 
evidentiary hearing or without also finding that there are no 
disputed facts with respect to the finding. (R. 553). The lower 
court: aid neither and the record reflects that the evidence would 
not support such a finding even had the court done so. (R. 552-
554, 266) . 
The Defendants claim in their ''Statement of Case" that the 
disputed facts which the Plaintiffs rely on are from inadmissable 
affidavits of Gordon Zilles and Lyle Tuddenham. A review of the 
affidavits and depositions show otherwise. (R. 239-246). And 
although the Defendants attempted to strike the affidavits of 
Gordon Zilles and Lyle Tuddenham, Defendants' motion to strike 
was never granted, and that motion relied heavily on Mr. 
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Tuddenhamfs deposition which was never completed and which 
Plaintiffs had no opportunity to cross-examine. (See R. 496). 
Mr., Daines had no opportunity to cross-examine because of the 
deposition schedule which Defendants arranged and unilaterally 
imposed on Plaintiffs counsel with very short notice, taking a 
full week's block of time directly prior to the hearing on the 
motion to depose each Plaintiff. 
But the best evidence supporting Plaintiffs' contention that 
there are disputed material facts is based on the Letter of 
Intent itself under which CVD and IMPA had been operating up 
until the time of the alleged combination. That Letter of Intent 
specifically provided that the different parties would operate 
under separate ownership of their respective assets, that 
employees would remain employees of the respective employers, and 
that IMPA would cause CVD to be reimbursed for the use of CVD 
plants through IMPA's payment of CVD debts. (R. 538). These 
points were reiterated in the affidavits of Mr. Zilles and Mr. 
Tuddenham and in their depositions which Defendants only now seek 
to introduce. In other words, the entanglements between the 
parties resulted from the Letter of Intent, which was terminable, 
by its own terms, not by the combination. 
On page 22 of Defendants' response brief, they cite Peterson 
v. Hoages, 239 P. 2d 180 (Utah 1951), as a Utah application of 
the Restatement of Restitution, Section 65. However, a reading 
of Peterson v. Hodges finds no correlation between the 
Restatement of Restitution as Defendants attempt to apply it in 
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this case. Peterson v. Hodges is a landlord/tenant matter 
involving a lease whose existence no one disputed. In addition, 
that matter involved a "mutual" rescission of the lease contract. 
In this case, we have no mutual rescission and we have no 
contract• 
The second case cited by the Defendants is also 
distinguishable. Mclntire v. KDI Corporation, 406 F. Supp. 592 
(S.D. Ohio 1957), deals with the sale of securities and has 
nothing to do with the legality of a merger between two 
corporations. After citing those two (2) cases, the Defendants 
boldly state "that it is horn book law that restitution is an 
essential element of 'a claim for rescission." Even if it is 
horn-book law, it does not apply to this case. The Defendants 
would have to believe that the detrimental reliance and 
intermingling of assets upon which Defendants rely in arguing 
tnat "rescission" would be inequitable, was a result of the 
combination between the two cooperatives. In fact it was a 
result of the Letter of Intent dated June 15, 1984, which clearly 
by its own terms, provided for a termination and avoidance of all 
of the obligations under the Letter of Intent. (See paragraph 
21, Letter of Intent, R. 541). 
It appears that the result Defendants are really after is to 
have this Court reform the Letter of Intent to be a binding 
contract for a sale of assets from CVD to IMPA and then declare 
that rescission of the reformed contract would be inequitable. 
And Defendants want all this even though the Letter of Intent 
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clearly states that it is not a merger or sale of assets and that 
it is terminable by the parties. (R. 536-592). 
The next Utah case which Defendants rely on in support of 
their argument on rescission is Toscano v. Social Services, 624 
p. 2d 1156 (Utah 1981). That case is hardly close to any facts 
attributable to this case. In Toscano this Court ordered the 
Defendant individual to repay the Department of Social Services 
for financial assistance payments which the Defendant received 
based on erroneous information which was provided on his 
application for assistance. This Court found that the Defendant 
had not so changed his circumstances to make restitution to the 
State inequitable. In this case, Toscano can be used to support 
Plaintiffs1 position in that it was in fact IMPA that was 
receiving the benefits from the CVD Amalga plant and its equities 
therein to allow it to obtain the claimed $18,000,000.00 line of 
credit with the Sacramento Bank of Cooperatives. Beyond that, 
Toscano has no application to this case. 
Defendants cite Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P. 2d 121 (Utah 
1983), as supporting this Court's position in Toscano. 
Christensen is another case that involves a contract. A cattle 
agistor was allowed to recover for his services in feeding and 
caring for cattle. The only part of the decision that appears at 
all applicable to Toscano, let alone the case at bar, appears to 
be the ruling by this Court that "as a general rule, an agistor 
may not obtain a quantum meruit recovery for the feeding and care 
of cattle if he has wrongfully retained possession of them. The 
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buraen of proving wrongfulness is on the party benefitted by the 
agistor's services." (citations omitted). It appears from that 
ruling that if the Plaintiffs prove the wrongfulness of IMPA's 
actions with respect to the combination then Defendants would not 
be entitled to the restitution they claim Plaintiffs must tender 
to qualify for rescission, according to their own argument. 
It is the Defendants who created the conditions of 
entanglement and reliance and change of circumstance which they 
now wish to rely on to avoid the clear requirements of the law 
with respect to the combination. It is they who have furthered 
the entanglements by pushing through two additional combinations 
since the contested one at bar. The Defendants ask this Court to 
encourage persons to avoid statutory requirements of merger and 
consolidation by authorizing boards of directors of two 
corporations to allow their operations and assets to be co-
mmgled beyond division. Is one to support that this is a "new" 
form of combination; combination by irreversible commingling. 
The Defendants want to justify their end result despite 
their means of acnieving them. Such a "new" policy would shoot a 
gaping hole through the legislative controls that State 
Government has consistently exercised over corporate power and in 
protection of stockholder's interests. 
Defendants next claim that Plaintiffs action should be 
barred by their unreasonable delay. This argument deserves 
little reply since it is clear from the record that it was only 
shortly after the alleged transfer of assets was fully completed 
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that the Plaintiffs filed their action. Six (6) months is 
certainly not an unreasonable delay, especially considering the 
attempts that the Plaintiffs first made with other members of the 
Board of CVD to try to resolve the problem of the illegal 
combination before filing suit. 
It was not until title passed on the CVD Amalga plant in 
August of 1986 that CVD Board members could have learned of the 
potential conflict over the full extent and impact of the alleged 
combination with IMPA. After August, rumors began circulating 
and inquiries were made to Defendant Wilson. (See R. 75-77, 79-
83). Defendant Wilson then responded in a letter to the Board 
dated November 19, 1986 (R. 65-74) which led to the CVD Board 
Meeting of December 17, 1986. (R. 384). It was only then that 
the full impact of IMPAfs position became known to the 
Plaintiffs. The Defendants rely on Andrews v. Precision 
Apparatus, Inc., 271 F. Supp 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), to suggest that 
even ten (10) days would be improper and an unacceptable delay to 
assert the Plaintiffs' claim. However, that case, again, is 
clearly distinguishable. There, the Plaintiff was seeking to 
enjoin a merger after the merger had become effective by filing 
articles of consolidation. That case did not involve an 
allegation of an illegal consolidation. Plaintiffs here claim 
that the combination was done outside of the legal requirements. 
In addition, by Defendants' own admission, the combination was 
never formalized pursuant to legal requirements by filing 
articles of consolidation or merger. The first time it became 
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clear that the Defendants were claiming that they accomplished a 
transfer of assets was after Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed and 
answered. 
Finally, Defendants claim that rescission or cancellation 
are not available remedies where the Plaintiffs have a "plain, 
adequate and complete remedy at law" through damages. That 
argument is irrelevant because Plaintiffs clearly did seek first 
"money damages" (See Verified Complaint at R. 6-7). If conceded 
that the legal argument is correct and applicable in this case, 
there is still no evidence to support the position that 
Plaintiffs can be fully compensated with money. As a matter of 
fact, the record will reveal that IMPA has suffered serious 
losses after its combination with CVD and continues to do so, and 
there are serious questions as to whether IMPA would be capable 
of paying damages to the Plaintiffs if they were awarded. 
II. REPLY TO POINT II 
Defendants again mischaracterize Plaintiffs' position with 
respect to the issue of the lower court's refusal to certify 
Plaintiffs as class representatives. Plaintiffs do not challenge 
the lower court's discretion but claim that the lower court 
cannot dismiss Plaintiffs' action based on Plaintiffs' failure to 
meet the Court's requirements to be certified as representatives 
of the class. 
The lower court specifically found in its Memorandum 
Decision that the Plaintiffs "may have different interests" with 
other members of the class. However, the lower court failed to 
determine if the questions of law or fact were in fact common to 
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the class, whether the claims of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims of the class, and whether the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. (See Rule 23(a) U.R.C.P.) Plaintiffs 
claim that the lower court should have made specific findings 
with respect to why the class action was not qualified pursuant 
to the statutory guidelines. In addition, Plaintiffs should have 
been allowed to have the class action altered or amended pursuant 
to Rule 23(c)(1) to meet the lower court's concerns rather than 
dismiss the case. Just because there are different classes 
within the proposed class does not necessarily mean that all of 
their interests with respect to the class action cannot be 
represented by the proposed class representatives. 
Defendants rely on information in the affidavit of Leland 
Anderson which was submitted and filed with the Court in 
conjunction with a Supplemental Memorandum in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Request for Class Certification (R. 525). This was 
tiled after the hearing on all of the motions before the Court 
and which was completely beyond any time limitations allowed for 
filing of such memorandum. Nonetheless, if the Court finds that 
it would be appropriate to consider the document, the Defendants 
rely on an extraneous vote which took place subsequent to the 
combination between IMPA and CVD to suggest that the CVD 
membership somehow ratified the illegal combination of IMPA and 
CVD. Such argument does not follow any logic. First of all, 
there is no basis in the law for allowing corporate membership to 
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ratify illegal acts of the corporation ex post facto. Secondly, 
the subsequent voting had to do with completely separate issues 
and parties. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Court can draw any 
conclusions from the results of such a vote. 
The subsequent voting referred to by Defendants may very 
well have had the outcome from CVD members because of their 
belief that their equity interest in CVD may be furthered by 
supporting a new organization in control of CVD assets other than 
IMPA. No one can predict with any certainty what the voters were 
thinking. Nevertheless Defendants conclude that the Defendants* 
illegal acts in combining IMPA with CVD were ratified by that 
subsequent vote on a subsequent merger that involved different 
entities. They then attempt to boot strap that unsupported 
conclusion with a further argument that Plaintiffs' allegations 
are now moot because of the subsequent merger. Such' a position 
carries to the ridiculous Defendants' earlier position that they 
can circumvent the law Dy entangling the parties involved to such 
a degree that it becomes "impossible" to pull the entities apart 
without causing inequities. Now they go even further to claim 
that if one can later get the membership of the entities involved 
to approve a subsequent combination that is conducted pursuant to 
law, that such ratifies the illegal acts and insulates the 
violators from being answerable to legislative requirements. 
Such an argument bears no further comment. 
III. REPLY TO POINT III 
Despite Defendants' claims to the contrary, Utah Code 
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Annotated Section 3-1-30 et seq. clearly sets forth the 
requirements for an agricultural cooperative to combine with 
another, whether it be called merger, consolidation or transfer 
of assets. It is curious that in all the mounds of pleading, 
briefing and memorandum of points and authorities on the record, 
the Defendants cannot produce one shred of authority that 
supports their alleged transfer of assets being conducted in the 
manner that it was. The transfer was without Board approval, 
without proper notice to members of the corporation and despite 
notice being sent to certain members that a combination was going 
to be conducted pursuant to certain specific statutes and then 
those statutes being ignored. 
Although Defendants now maintain that what they did with CVD 
on December 16, 1985 was really a transfer of assets (despite the 
notices to the contrary) they have never been able to explain the 
IMPA Resolution adopted December 19, 1985, three (3) days after 
the CVD meeting. (See Resolution, R. 326). That resolution 
purports to have the IMPA Board abandon what the Resolution 
therein admits was a Plan of Merger (consolidation) approved by 
CVD membership. How can the CVD membership be alleged to approve 
a merger and then IMPA unilaterally abandon it and on its own 
then appropriate all CVD assets without any further CVD Board or 
membership action? This unbelievable maneuvering, in a nut 
shell, proves IMPA's ill will, bad faith and lack of any legal 
basis for their current position. 
Plaintiffs rely principally on their arguments in their 
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initial brief in arguing the balance of this issue. Plaintiffs 
do note that the lower court erred in failing to determine that 
if Section 3-1-30 et seq. did not apply what other procedures 
would apply. It erred in not finding that even had Defendants 
conducted or achieved a combination by means of a transfer of 
assets, that Defendants needed to meet the statutory requirements 
required by a corporate transfer of all or substantially all 
assets out of the ordinary course, to wit: proper notice to 
members and proper approval by a Board of Directors. 
Defendants misrepresent Plaintiffs' legal position with 
respect to the exclusivity of the merger statute. Plaintiffs 
take the position that pursuant to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding this case, including but not limited to the notice 
that the exclusive method for the combination of CVD and IMPA was 
through that cooperative statute. But Plaintiffs have always, in 
the alternative, argued that if a merger by way of U.C.A. 3-1-30 
et seq. was not the exclusive remedy, then the combination would 
need to be conducted pursuant to general corporate law, or if not 
by that, then by common law, and that the combination failed 
under any of those procedures. 
Defendants claim that the Court made no finding with respect 
to whether the alleged transfer of assets between CVD and IMPA 
was done properly. The lower courtfs failure to make a finding 
with respect thereto was apparently based on the Court's 
erroneous belief that Plaintiffs1 complaint failed to seek 
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monetary damages based on an improper combination and that the 
court did not need to reach that issue. Plaintiffs' Complaint 
clearly, does seek such remedies. (See Verified Complaint, 
paragraph 36-39. (R. 7). 
Defendants also argue that Section 3-1-9(1) grants 
agricultural cooperatives broad powers, including a transfer of 
aii or substantially all of the assets to the corporation outside 
of the ordinary course of its business and without board or 
membership approval. In support of that position, they quote the 
first parr of paragraph (I) of Section 3-1-9 but fail to include 
the last part of the paragraph which clearly limits a 
cooperative's rights. It states: "and [a cooperative] may 
exercise all powers, rights, and privileges necessary or incident 
thereto including the exercise of any rights, powers and 
privileges granted by the laws of this state to cooperations 
generally, excepting such as are inconsistent with the expressed 
provisions of this act." Section 3-1-9(1) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). This language appears to clearly limit the 
powers of the cooperative to powers that are generally granted to 
business corporations, and only then if such powers are not 
otherwise inconsistent. Plaintiffs believe that 3-1-30, et seq. 
may be more limiting. But Defendants' argument goes much further 
in alleging their activities are subject to no statuory controls. 
Suqh a theory is nonsensical. 
The Defendants quote the comments of Senator Harwood in 
support of their position. However, the Senator's quote on page 
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40 of Defendants' Response Brief, better supports the position of 
the Plaintiffs- The Senator says that "evidently there has not 
been provided the means for corporation and cooperatives-
agricultural cooperatives-to merge"• suggests that cooperatives 
have not had the ability to merge or combine in the past. Or, if 
they did, the Senator states it was done through the "tedious 
procedure of either buying assets or buying stock or some other 
means that sometimes makes it difficult or even impossible". 
Clearly the Senator was not referring to the kind of "transfer of 
assets" that the Defendants are claiming in this case. It 
certainly appears from the record that the procedure used was 
less tedious and cumbersome than even the merger requirements 
that were espoused by Senator Harwood. In fact, it is clear from 
Detendant Wilson's own remarks that the Defendants chose the 
transfer of assets means of combination because they knew they 
could not achieve the results through following the statute. 
(See R. 66, 80-81) . 
In short, Defendants reasoning is clearly flawed. If the 
law existing prior to the enactment of Section 3-1-30, et seq. 
would allow cooperatives to combine through the means used by 
Defendants, there would clearly be no need to enact the merger 
statute to "facilitate" such combinations. When Senator Harwood 
referred to the "tedious procedure" of transferring assets, he 
was referring to the common law requirement of unanimous 
shareholder approval. (See R. 57). The quoting of a statement 
made on the floor of the legislature by one senator hardly 
constitutes legislative intent or history? 
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Finally, the Defendants try to make the untenable point that 
the Plaintiffs have benefited from tYie combination of C\TD and 
IMPA. .However it is very rare that one would take an action to 
the State Supreme Court believing the position one is challenging 
is to one's benefit. The Defendants like to paint the picture 
that the Plaintiffs are six "disgruntled" rebels who are the only 
people associated with CVD and IMPA that have any desire to 
challenge the combination. However, as the record shows, there 
are numerous other potential Plaintiffs waiting to assert claims 
as Plaintiffs of record should such be necessary by 
disqualification of the class action. (R. 269). 
IV. REPLY TO POINT IV 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil procedure requires the lower 
court to at least enter a written statement of the grounds for 
its decision on ail motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a)(b) 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one (1) ground. In 
this case, tne requirement of Rule 52(a) clearly applies and 
would require the lower court to explain which motion it is 
ruling on. It is not clear from the lower court's action whether 
it was granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. If it was granting Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment it should specify the areas where it 
found their were undisputed facts to substantiate the Summary 
Judgment. If the court was granting the Motion to Dismiss, it 
must likewise specify on what grounds the motion is granted. The 
lower court made no such determinations but only made certain 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law which had no specific 
connection to the particular motions of the Defendants. 
V. REPLY TO ISSUE ON "FINALITY" OF MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Defendants have correctly pointed out in their "Summary 
of Argument" that the guestion of whether the memorandum decision 
was Ma final order" and therefore appealable was fully briefed 
before this Court pursuant to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
and a second Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for 
Summary Disposition of Rescission Claim. Plaintiffs refer the 
Court to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
response to those motions should the Court desire to consider 
that issue again. It is Plaintiffs1 position that this Court has 
already decided that issue twice in favor of Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
1. For the reasons set forth hereinabove, it is submitted 
that the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for 
the trial court to consider the case based on the Defendants1 
being restrained by the reguirements of Section 3-1-30 et seg. 
with respect to the combination of IMPA and CVD. 
2. Alternatively, that the combination of IMPA and CVD 
must follow the statutory procedures of Section 3-1-30 et seg. or 
the general corporate procedures set forth for business or non-
profit corporations by Utah Statute. 
3. Alternatively that the Defendants must follow the 
common law reguirements of the unanimous consent of the 
stockholders. 
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4. That there are disputed facts with respect to the issue 
of forms of relief available to the Plaintiffs, including 
rescission. 
5. That the lower court should determine if the 
requirements for proper certification of Plaintiffs' action as a 
class action are met, and what, if any, conflicts exist with 
Plaintiffs being representatives of the class and allow for 
alterations or amendments of the class action to meet any 
technical deficiencies found pursuant to Rule 23(c). 
DATED this %0 June, 1988. 
Attorney for Appellants 
KevirTTs.1 Kane 
Attorney for Appellants 
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